Complete List of Publications


[1973]                  An Objective Theory of Probability.  Methuen.  pp. 250 + x.

[1982]                  Frege, Dedekind, and Peano on the Foundations of Arithmetic.  Van Gorcum.  pp. 103 + ix.

[1992]                  Revolutions in Mathematics.  Oxford University Press.  pp. 353 + xi.  (Editor and Contributor)

[1993]                  Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century:  Four Central Themes.  Blackwell.  pp. 251 + xv.

[1995]                  La filosofia della scienza nel XX secolo.  Saggitari Laterza.  pp. 442 + xi.  (This is the Italian translation of [1993] with an additional section written by Professor Giulio Giorello of Milan          University.)

[1996]                  Artificial Intelligence and Scientific Method.  Oxford University Press.  pp. 176 + xiv.

[1998]                  Intelligenza artificiale e metodo scientifico.  Cortina, Milano.  (This is the Italian translation of [1996] with some revisions and updating.)

[2000]                  Philosophical Theories of Probability.  Routledge.  pp.223 + xiv.

[2002]                  Persian translation by Hassan Myandari of [1993] Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century

[2004a]                Kakuritsu no Testsugaku Riron, Japanese Translation by Chikako Nakayama of [2000] Philosophical Theories of Probability

[2004b]                Laws and Models in Science.  King’s College Publications.  pp. 259 + xiv.  (Editor) 

[2005]                  Mathematical Reasoning and Heuristics.  King’s College Publications.  pp. 212 + xxx.  (Editor with Carlo Cellucci of Rome University and Contributor)

[2008]                  How Should Research be Organised?  College Publications.  pp. 137 + xii.

[2011]                  Chinese Translation by Jianfeng Zhang of [2000] Philosophical Theories of Probability

[2019]                  Causality, Probability, and Medicine. Routledge. pp. 300 + xvi.


[1971]                  A Falsifying Rule for Probability Statements, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 22, pp. 231-261.

[1972a]                Operationalism, Synthese, 25, pp. 1-24.

[1972b]                The Subjective Theory of Probability, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 23, pp. 138-157.

[1978]                  The Development of Mathematics, British Journal for the                    Philosophy of Science, 29, pp. 68-87.

[1980a]                Brouwer’s Philosophy of Mathematics, Erkenntnis, 15, pp. 105-126.

[1980b]                Review of ‘Hugh Lehman.  Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics’, Philosophical Quarterly, pp. 166-168.

[1980c]                Phenomenology and the Infinite in Mathematics, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 31, pp. 289-298.

[1980d]                Review of ‘Applications of Inductive Logic’, edited by L. Jonathan Cohen and Mary Hesse.  The Times Higher Education Supplement, 7.1.80, p. 21.

[1981]                  Karl Menger as a Philosopher, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 32, pp. 183-196.

[1982a]                Review of ‘Hans Hahn.  Empiricism, Logic and Mathematics. Philosophical Papers’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 33, pp. 217-220.

[1982b]                Wittgenstein and Revisionism, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 33, pp. 422-433.

[1983]                  Chomsky’s Approach to Linguistics, Methodology and Science, 16(2), pp. 90-118.

[1984a]                Review of ‘Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects’ by Crispin Wright, Mind, XCIII, pp. 613-617.

[1984b]                Review of ‘Frege:  An Introduction to his Philosophy’ by Gregory Currie, The Philosophical Quarterly, 34, pp. 422-424.

[1985a]                The Analytic/Synthetic Problem, Ratio, 27(2), pp. 149-159.

[1985b]                Review of ‘The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge’ by Philip Kitcher, The Philosophical Quarterly, 35, pp. 104-107.

[1986]                  In Defence of the Popper-Miller Argument, Philosophy of Science, 53, pp. 110-113.

[1987a]                (with G. Ietto-Gillies, South Bank University, London)  Probability and Economics in the Works of Bruno de Finetti, Economia Internazionale, XL, pp. 3-20.

[1987b]                Was Bayes a Bayesian?, Historia Mathematica, 14, pp. 325-346.

[1988a]                Induction and Probability.  In An Encyclopaedia of Philosophy,   Edited by G.H.R.Parkinson, Routledge, Ch. 9, pp. 179-204.

[1988b]                (with Charles S. Chihara, University of California at Berkeley)  An Interchange on the Popper-Miller Argument, Philosophical Studies, 54, pp. 1-8.

[1988c]                Keynes as a Methodologist, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 39, pp. 117-129.

[1989a]                (with Philip Dawid, University College London) A Bayesian Analysis of Hume’s Argument Concerning Miracles, The Philosophical Quarterly, 39, pp. 57-65.

[1989b]                Non-Bayesian Confirmation Theory, and the Principle of Explanatory Surplus, PSA 1988, Vol. 2, pp. 373-380.

[1990a]                The Turing-Good Weight of Evidence Function and Popper’s Measure of the Severity of a Test, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 41, pp. 143-146.

[1990b]                Bayesianism versus Falsificationism, Ratio, New Series III(1), pp. 82-98.

[1990c]                Intuitionism versus Platonism:  a 20th Century Controversy concerning the Nature of Numbers, in Fernando Gil (ed.) Scientific and Philosophical Controversies, Fragmentos, 1990, pp. 299-314.

[1991a]                A Bayesian Proof of a Humean Principle, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 42, pp. 255-256.

[1991b]                (with G. Ietto-Gillies, South Bank University, London)  Intersubjective Probability and Economics, Review of Political Economy, 3.4, pp. 393-417.

[1991d]                Review of ‘Karl R. Popper. A World of Propensities’,                                  Philosophy , 66, pp. 392-394.

[1991c]                Intersubjective Probability and Confirmation Theory, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 42, pp. 513-533.

[1992a]                Comments on ‘Scientific Discovery as Problem Solving’ by Herbert A. Simon, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 6, pp. 29-31.

[1992b]                Confirmation Theory and Machine Learning, Proceedings of the International Workshop on Inductive Logic Programming, Tokyo, pp. 1-12.

[1992c]                Do we need Mathematical Objects?  British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 43, pp. 263-278.

[1993a]                (with L.E.Sucar and D.F.Gillies, Imperial College)  Objective Probabilities in Expert Systems, Artificial Intelligence, 61, pp. 187-208.

[1993b]                Review of  ‘R.N.D.Martin.  PIERRE DUHEM.  Philosophy and History in the Work of a Believing Physicist’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 1, pp. 172-174.

[1994a]                Philosophies of probability.  In I. Grattan-Guinness (ed.)  Companion Encyclopaedia of the History and Philosophy of the Mathematical Sciences, Routledge, pp. 1407-1414.

[1994b]                Review of ‘John Earman.  Bayes or Bust?  A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory’, Mind, 103, pp. 376-379.

[1994c]                A Rapprochement between Deductive and Inductive Logic, Bulletin of the IGPL, 2, pp. 149-166.

[1995a]                Inaugural Lecture:  Could computers become superior to human beings?, Published by King’s College London.

[1995b]                Popper’s Contribution to the Philosophy of Probability.  In Anthony O’Hear (ed.), Karl Popper:  Philosophy and Problems, Cambridge University Press, pp. 103-120.

[1996a]                Poincaré:  Conservative Methodologist but Revolutionary                    Scientist, Philosophia Scientiae, 1(4), pp. 59-67.

[1996b]                Review of ‘Matteo Motterlini(ed.) Imre Lakatos. Paul K. Feyerabend.  Sull’orlo della scienza:  Pro e contro il metodo’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 47, pp. 476-78.

[1997]                  Review of ‘Charles R. McCann.  Probability Foundations of Economic Theory’, Economics and Philosophy, 13(1), pp. 132-134.

[1998a]                (with Yuxin Zheng, Nanjing University)  Dynamic Interactions with the Philosophy of Mathematics, Studies in Dialectics of Nature, 14(9), pp. 7-11.  (In Chinese)

[1998b]                Confirmation Theory.  In D.M.Gabbay and P.Smets (eds.), Handbook of Defeasible Reasoning and Uncertainty Management Systems, Volume 1, Kluwer, pp. 135-167.

[1998c]                Debates on Bayesianism and the theory of Bayesian networks, Theoria, 64(1), pp. 1-22.

[1998d]                Review of ‘Paolo Mancosu.  Philosophy of Mathematics and Mathematical Practice in the Seventeenth Century’, Philosophia Mathematica, 6(2), pp. 231-235.

[1999a]                Probability and Uncertainty in Keynes’s General Theory,  The Keizai Seminar, 529(2), pp. 83-97. (In Japanese)

[1999b]                Review of ‘Carlo Cellucci.  Le Ragioni della Logica [The Reasons of Logic]’, Philosophia Mathematica, 7(2/3), pp. 213-222.

[1999c]                German Philosophy of Mathematics from Gauss to Hilbert.  In Anthony O’Hear (ed.),  German Philosophy Since Kant, Cambridge University Press, pp. 167-192.

[2000a]                An Empiricist Philosophy of Mathematics and its Implications for the History of Mathematics, in E. Grosholz and H. Breger (eds.), The Growth of Mathematical Knowledge, Synthese Library/Volume 289, Kluwer, pp. 41-57.

[2000b]                Varieties of Propensity, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 51, 807-835.

[2001a]                (with Yuxin Zheng, Nanjing University) Dynamic Interactions with the Philosophy of Mathematics, Theoria, 16, pp. 437-459. (This is an extended version of 1998a in English.)

[2001b]                Popper and computer induction, BioEssays, 23.9, pp. 859-860.

[2001c]                Critical Notice of ‘Judea Pearl, Causality, Reasoning, and Inference, Cambridge University Press, 2000’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 52, pp. 613-622.

[2001d]                (with G. Ietto-Gillies, University of South Bank, London) Keynes’s Notion of Causa Causans and its Application to the Globalisation Process.  In Philip Arestis, Meghnad Desai and Sheila Dow (eds.), Methodology, Microeconomics and Keynes. Essays in Honour of Victoria Chick, Volume Two, Routledge, pp. 136-148.

[2001e]                Bayesianism and the Fixity of the Theoretical Framework.  In David Corfield and Jon Williamson (eds.), Foundations of Bayesianism, Kluwer, pp. 363-379.

[2001f]                 The Spectrum from Objective to Subjective Probability.  In Marcello D’Agostino, Giulio Giorello, Salvatore Veca (eds.), Logica e Politica. Per Marco Mondadori, Il Saggiatore, pp. 325-339.

[2002a]                Lakatos’ Criticisms of Popper.  In George Kampis, Ladislav Kvasz, Michael Stöltzner (eds.) Appraising Lakatos, Kluwer, pp. 13-22.

[2002b]                Logicism and the Development of Computer Science.  In Antonis C. Kakas and Fariba Sadri (eds.)  Computational Logic:  Logic Programming and Beyond, Part II, Springer, pp. 588-604.

[2002c]                Causality, Propensity, and Bayesian Networks, Synthese, 132, pp. 63-88.

[2003a]                Review of ‘Carlo Cellucci.  Filosofia e matematica [Philosophy and mathematics]’, Philosophia Mathematica, 11(2), pp. 246-253.

[2003b]                Review of ‘Michael Dummett.  La natura e il futuro della filosofia [The nature and future of philosophy]’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 54, pp. 501-507.

[2003c]                Probability and Uncertainty in Keynes’s The General Theory.  In Jochen Runde and Sohei Mizuhara (eds.) The Philosophy of Keynes’s Economics.  Probability, Uncertainty, and Convention, Routledge, pp. 111-129

[2004c]                Probability in Artificial Intelligence.  In Luciano Floridi (ed.) Philosophy of Computing and Information, Blackwell, pp. 276-288.

[2004d]                Can Mathematics be used successfully in Economics?  In Edward Fullbrook (ed.) A Guide to What Wrong with Economics, Anthem Press, pp. 187-197.

[2004e]                Handling Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, and the Bayesian Controversy.  In Friedrich Stadler (ed.) Induction and Deduction in the Sciences, Kluwer, pp.  199-216.

[2004f]   El problema de la demacacación y la Medicina alternativa.  In Wenceslao J. González (ed.) Karl R Popper:  Revisión de su legado, Unión Editorial, pp. 197-219. (In Spanish) (Downloadable version is in English)

[2004g]   El problema de la inducción y la Inteligencia Artificial. In Wenceslao J. González (ed.) Karl R Popper:  Revisión de su legado, Unión Editorial, pp. 243-66. (In Spanish) (Downloadable version is in English)

[2005a]                Hempelian and Kuhnian approaches in the philosophy of medicine:  the Semmelweis case, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36, pp. 159-181.

[2005b]                Heuristics and Mathematical Discovery: the Case of Bayesian Networks.  In Carlo Cellucci and Donald Gillies (eds.) Mathematical Reasoning and Heuristics, King’s College Publications, pp. 87-118.

[2005c]                An Action-Related Theory of Causality, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 56, pp. 823-842.

[2005d]                Subjective and Objective Probabilities in Medical Decision-Making, Journal of Death and Life Studies, 6, pp. 349(44) – 331(62).  (In Japanese)

[2006a]                Subjective and Objective Probabilities in Medical Decision-Making, Bulletin of Death and Life Studies, Vol. 2, Philosophy of Uncertainty and Medical Decisions, Proceedings of the COE Conference ‘Consent and Decision Concerning Life and Death’ 11-12 December, 2004, Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology, The University of Tokyo, pp. 87-100. (English Version of 2005d)

[2006b]                Keynes and probability.  In Roger E. Backhouse & Bradley W. Bateman (eds.) The Cambridge Companion to Keynes, Cambridge University Press, pp. 199-216.

[2006c]                Kuhn on Discovery and the Case of Penicillin.  In Wenceslao J. Gonzalez and Jesus Alcolea (eds.)  Contemporary Perspectives in Philosophy and Methodology of Science, Netbiblo, S.L., pp. 47-63.

[2007a]                Lessons from the History and Philosophy of Science regarding the Research Assessment Exercise.  In Anthony O’Hear (ed.) Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University Press, pp. 37-73.

[2007b]                (with Atocha Aliseda, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM)) Logical, Historical and Computational Approaches.  In Theo Kuipers (ed.) General Philosophy of Science.  Focal Issues, North-Holland, pp. 431-513.

[2007c]                Review of ‘Codell Carter.  The Rise of Causal Concepts of Disease.  Case Histories.’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58, pp. 365-377.

[2007d]                Review of ‘Maria Carla Galavotti. Philosophical Introduction to Probability’. Philosophia Mathematica, 15(3), pp. 129-132.

[2008a]                Review of ‘Julian Baggini, Jeremy Stangroom (eds.):  New British Philosophy.  The Interviews’, Organon F, 15(2), pp. 247-261.

[2009a]                Problem-Solving and the Problem of Induction.  In Zuzana Parusniková and Robert S. Cohen (eds.) Rethinking Popper, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Springer, pp. 103-115.

[2009b]                How Should Research be Organised?  An Alternative to the UK Research Assessment Exercise.  In Leemon McHenry (ed.) Science and the Pursuit of Wisdom.  Studies in the Philosophy of Nicholas Maxwell, Ontos Verlag, pp. 147-168.

[2009c]                Review of ‘Hasok Chang. Inventing Temperature: Measurement and Scientific Progress’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 60(1), pp. 221-228.

[2010a]                Informational Realism and World 3, Knowledge, Technology & Policy, 23(1), pp. 7-24.

[2010b]                Abduction and Bayesianism in Medical Diagnosis, Ludus Vitalis, XVIII(33), pp. 217-220.

[2011a]                The Russo-Williamson thesis and the question of whether smoking causes heart disease.  In Phyllis McKay Illari, Federica Russo, and Jon Williamson (eds.) Causality in the Sciences, Oxford University Press, pp. 110-125.

[2011b]                The Empiricist View of Logic.  In Carlo Cellucci, Emily Grosholz and Emiliano Ippoliti (eds.) Logic and Knowledge, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 175-190.

[2011c]                Meno-like Discoveries in Mathematics and Science, Paradigmi, XXIX(3), pp. 29-44.

[2012a]                The Use of Mathematics in Physics and Economics: A Comparison. In Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao J. González, Stephan Hartmann, Michael Stöltzner and Marcel Weber (eds.) Probabilities, Laws, and Structures, Springer, pp. 351-362.

[2012b]                Economics and Research Assessment Systems, Economic Thought, 1(1), pp. 23-47.

[2012c]                Review of ‘Erling Norrby. Nobel Prizes and Life Sciences’, British Journal for the History of Science, 45(1), pp. 142-3.

[2013a]                (with Aidan Sudbury) Should causal models always be Markovian? The case of multi-causal forks in medicine, European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 3(3), pp. 275-308.

[2013b]                Review of ‘Darrell Rowbottom. Popper’s Critical Rationalism. A Philosophical Introduction’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 64(1), pp. 229-232.

[2013c]                Review of ‘K Codell Carter. The decline of therapeutic bloodletting and the collapse of traditional medicine’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 44(3), pp. 433-434.

[2013d]                (with Brendan Clarke, Phyllis Illari, Federica Russo, and Jon Williamson) The evidence that evidence-based medicine omits, Preventive Medicine, 57, pp. 745-747.

[2014a]                Should Philosophers of Mathematics Make Use of Sociology? Philosophia Mathematica, 22(1), pp. 12-34.

[2014b]                Selecting applications for funding: why random choice is better than peer review, RT. A Journal on Research Policy and Evaluation, 2, pp. 1-14.

[2014c]                A new branch of philosophy of science: The philosophy of medicine.  Review of ‘Raffaella Campaner: Philosophy of medicine: Causality, evidence and explanation. Bologna, Archetipolibri.’ Metascience, 23, pp. 319-322.

[2014d]                Why do Scientific Revolutions begin? In Emiliano Ippoliti (Ed.) Heuristic Reasoning, Springer, pp. 89-112.

[2014e]                Review of ‘Timothy Childers. Philosophy and Probability’, Philosophia Mathematica, 22(3), pp. 413-417.

[2014f]                 (with Brendan Clarke, Phyllis Illari, Federica Russo and Jon Williamson) Mechanisms and the Evidence Hierarchy, Topoi, 33(2), pp. 339-360.

[2014g]                Serendipity and Mathematical Logic. In Emiliano Ippoliti and Cesare Cozzo (Eds.) From a Heuristic Point of View. Essays in Honour of Carlo Cellucci, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 23-39.

[2015a]                Serendipity and Chance in Scientific Discovery: Policy Implications for Global Society. In Daniele Archibugi and Andrea Filippetti (Eds.) The Handbook of Global Science, Technology, and Innovation, WILEY Blackwell, pp. 525-539.

[2015b]                Perché la rivoluzione copernicana ha avuto luogo in Europa e non in Cina? In Paolo Pecere (Ed.) Il libro della natura, Carocci, pp. 29-65. (In Italian) (Downloadable version is in English)

[2015c]                An Aristotelian approach to mathematical ontology. In Ernest Davis and Philip J. Davis (Eds.) Mathematics, Substance and Surmise. Views on the Meaning and Ontology of Mathematics, Springer, pp. 147-176.

[2015d] Paul Mason’s PostCapitalism, Real-World Economics Review, 73, pp. 110-119, December.

[2016a]                Technological Origins of the Einsteinian Revolution, Philosophy & Technology, 29(2), pp. 97-126.

[2016b]                The Propensity Interpretation. In Alan Hájek and Christopher Hitchcock (Eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy, Oxford University Press, pp. 406-422.

[2016c]                Establishing Causality in Medicine and Koch’s Postulates, International Journal of History and Philosophy of Medicine, 6: 10603, pp. 1-13.

[2017a]                Frequency and Propensity: The Interpretation of Probability in Causal Models for Medicine.  In Solomon, Miriam; Simon, Jeremy R.; and Kincaid, Harold (Eds.) The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Medicine, Routledge, pp. 71-80.

[2017b]                Mechanisms in Medicine, Axiomathes, 27, pp. 621-634.

[2017c]                Evidence of mechanism in the evaluation of streptomycin and thalidomide, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 66(December), pp. 55-62.

[2018]                  Discovering Cures in Medicine.  In David Danks and Emiliano Ippoliti (Eds.) Building Theories. Heuristics and Hypotheses in Sciences, Springer, pp. 83-100. 

[2019a]                Should we distrust medical interventions? Review of ‘Jacob Stegenga, Medical Nihilism’, Metascience, 28(2, July), pp. 273-276.

[2019b]                Commentary on Kate E. Lynch, Emily C. Parke, and Maureen A. O’Malley: ‘How Causal are Microbiomes? A Comparison with the Helicobacter pylori Explanation of Ulcers’, Biology & Philosophy, 34(6, December), p. 56.

[2020a]                Medicine as unsuccessful inquiry. Review of ‘Alex Broadbent, Philosophy of Medicine’, Metascience, 29(1, March), pp. 113-116.

[2020b]                The Empirical Success of Keynesianism, Economic Thought, 9(1), pp.  24-43.

[2020c] Realism and AIM (Action, Intervention, Manipulation) Theories of Causality. In Wenceslao J. Gonzalez (Ed.) New Approaches to Scientific Realism, De Gruyter, 2020, pp. 291-304.

[2021a] Evidential Pluralism and the Effectiveness of Treatments in Medicine, The Reasoner, 15(6, December), pp. 48-49.

[2021b] Difficulties in the Logical Interpretation of Probability, History of Economic Ideas, XXIX(3), pp. 143-147,